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SUMMARY 
 
This paper examines how various components of peace building programmes in 
different sectors can be co-ordinated. It starts with the examination of the practice by 
various co-ordinating mechanisms applied to post-conflict peace building operations. 
By using the example of Bosnia, the paper examines various features of vertical and 
lateral co-ordination and discusses how NGO operations can support major international 
agencies in converting their strategic level decisions into field operations. 
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I. Introduction  
 
In order to be effective, the work of various organizations has to be embedded in the 
overall peace building plan. Improved planning and effective organizational 
co-ordination are crucial for successful peace operation. Given the limited commitment  
and resources from various external organizations, a successful mission benefits from 
operational effectiveness. Co-ordination and teamwork are essential for maximisation of 
the effects of each component’s operation. 
Multi-component peace building programs require both vertical and horizontal 
co-ordination among a large number of organizations, which have diverse 
responsibilities. In a multi- functional mission, with geographical dispersion, there is 
always a danger of miscommunication if each component reports only to its central 
headquarters without lateral contact at every level. Since various components of peace 
building missions often work in the same theatre of operation in isolation and against 
each other, horizontal co-ordination is critical for promoting the collaboration of actions 
among organizations. 
At the same time, vertical co-ordination is also necessary for policy 
implementation across levels. ‘The co-ordination of activities within a mission 
presupposes a certain unity of command to ensure that a coherent strategy is 
consistently carried out’ (Mockaitis, 1999, p. 135). Through vertical communication, 
the local wealth of knowledge (which is necessary for strategic decision making) is 
passed up to higher level agencies. Operation through vertical co-ordination is made 
through communication lines among various types of agencies at international, regional 
and local offices. Due to the limitations of major international organizations to reach 
local communities, NGOs fill in the gaps between decision-making agencies at the 
centre and local communities. 
This paper examines how various components of peace building programs in 
different sectors can be co-ordinated. It starts with the examination of the practice by 
various co-ordinating mechanisms applied to post-conflict peace building operations. 
By using the example of Bosnia, the paper examines various features of vertical and 
lateral co-ordination and discusses how NGO operations can support major international 
agencies in converting their strategic level decisions into field operations. 
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II. Operational Structures 
 
In response to the demand for more leadership of the international community, the post 
of a Special Representative designated by the Secretary General (SRSG) was newly 
created with the authority for the overall co-ordination of UN peace building missions. 
Prior to the 1989 Namibia mission, the commanders of peacekeeping forces operating 
under the UN mandates de facto acted as heads of the missions, and carried out 
negotiations with the assistance of their political advisors (Williams, 1998). However, in 
the last decade, it has become a norm for the civilian component to be responsible for 
the integral nature of UN operations. In most operations (e.g., Namibia and Cambodia), 
SRSG was authorized to serve as overall co-ordinator of a peace building process over 
both civilian and military subordinates. 
In complex operations, SRSG especially plays a critical role in providing great 
political directions in the field. The Special Representative can have ‘full responsibility 
for negotiating and implementing the peace process, managing the input of the UN 
Secretariat, mobilizing the support of the operational funds and programs for 
humanitarian and development activities and leading the team of autonomous 
specialized agencies’ (Wholly, 1997, p. 116). Therefore, the SRSG should have skills to 
effectively manage complex organizations and mobilize resources and public support as 
well as possessing negotiation and political skills. 
Martti Ahtisaari, the SRSG for the UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia 
(UNTAG) was overseeing the mission’s planning and subsequent implementation. 
While his main task was to be in charge of three thousand and five hundred civilians, of 
which close to half were hired for the civilian police force, he also helped set up the 
establishment of a joint working group on political problems. In the work of monitoring 
and preventing violence, the network of district officers reported the SRSG about 
political development. By informing local people as to the nature of the UN Namibia 
mandate, he was able to obtain support of the local population for the legitimacy of 
UNTAG. 
While the Namibia mission is considered one of the most successful 
post-conflict peace building operations, the SRSG has not always been able to draw 
political, civil and military elements together into a common approach. In practice, the 
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role and power of the Special Representative are affected by external support and the 
leadership quality. The SRSG in the UN mission to Mozambique (1992-1994), Aldo 
Ajello enjoyed more authority over the control of local situations through chairing 
supervisory and monitoring commissions than the Special Representative in Angola 
Margaret Anstee. Despite a great need for more international intervention, the Second 
UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) (1991-1995) was not able to go beyond 
observing and verifying the national elections with a limited number of personnel and 
resources, in part, related to devotion of international attention to other parallel 
operations. 
Successful co-operation also requires the proper allocation of resources, which 
are commensurate to the complexity of the tasks. Compared with the Namibia mission, 
the UN civil administration in Cambodia established in February 1992 had more 
difficult challenges with its expansion to a comprehensive settlement, including civil 
and electoral administration, repatriation, rehabilitation and protection of human rights. 
All these tasks had to be accomplished by only less than 200 inexperienced staff 
recruited to cover civil administration activities for both central and regional offices. 
While the UN eventually accomplished a full responsibility for the conduct of the poll 
(Findlay, 1995), UNTAC was not able to come up with more concerted efforts to 
resolve post-election political disputes. 
When the local administration is in disarray (Somalia, for example), an 
operation may be authorized by an international mandate to exercise more direct control. 
In that capacity, UN observers might set up and monitor local authority. The 
international mission can have an overriding authority to re-direct local policy decisions 
and even dismiss personnel. On the other hand, not every mission is required to have a 
direct control over local situations and some missions are more oriented toward 
assistance (El Salvador, for example). International operations can also adopt a 
partnership arrangement in establishing an international standard for the development of 
government structures. 
Many missions have divisions on elections, human rights, humanitarian relief 
and development as well as the military and police. Resident co-ordinator drawn from a 
wide range of UN bodies helps to organize more coherent UN activities in development 
areas at a country level. Given their expertise in development planning, the Resident 
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Representatives of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) are particularly in 
a position to fulfill the role for ensuring the focus of the country work in Rwanda, Haiti 
and other countries, which need development assistance. In recognition of its traditional 
work to protect responsibilities for refugees, the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR) has been designated as a lead agency for assistance to war victims. 
The resident co-ordinator can serve as Deputy to the SRSG for humanitarian and 
development activities (Whaley, 1997). The resident co-ordinator system is a useful 
mechanism to counter the pressures for fragmentation. 
Co-ordination issues become complicated, since many organizations tend to go 
beyond competence in particular areas of expertise with the development of dual 
mandates in other areas. For instance, UNDP and UNICEF have long-term social and 
economic development goals, but they have recently been involved in relief work, too, 
which addresses short-term humanitarian emergencies. At the same time, development 
agencies begin to pay more attention to fostering human rights with a focus on 
long-term social needs. 
The maximization of efforts fails because many organizations take 
simultaneous actions to achieve opposing goals (Whitman and Bartholomew, 1994). 
Incompatibilities between activities derive from different organizational goals, values 
and cultures. Funds to cover large expenses for reconstruction, land transfer, 
demobilization, judicial, military and police reform need to be mobilized by 
international financial institutions through donor meetings. At the same time, fiscal 
constraints often imposed by IMF austerity programs put pressure on the local 
population while being oriented toward tackling monetary and budgetary issues. A 
program on macro-economic stability needs to be counterbalanced with projects, which 
focus on micro level initiatives. 
Economic and social reconstruction cannot be co-ordinated through a clear 
chain of command, which is common in war zones. Centralization will not happen since 
various international agencies and NGOs want to keep autonomy and resist any 
attempts to impose external authority over them (Weiss, 1999). Since co-ordination has 
to be based on consensus, leadership lies in the capacity to orchestrate a coherent 
response and mobilize the key actors around common objectives and set up priorities. 
In the absence of an effective co-ordinating entity, the rudimentary exchange of 
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information can be achieved through regular briefing sessions. The compatibility of 
field activities can be promoted by the negotiation of inter-agency frameworks for 
action with the establishment of task teams on specific issues. Clear structures for 
co-ordination among key agencies emerge from the division of labor among actors. 
Overall, the degree of engaging actors in co-ordination differs according to domains and 
levels. 
 
III. Organizational Links and Levels of Operation: Bosnia 
 
Bosnia is particularly rich in the number and variety of programs designed for 
post-conflict reconstruction. In that sense, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a laboratory for 
applying new understandings of peace building to overcoming local challenges (Bosco, 
1998). Co-ordination in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is very complex due to heavy 
presence of international organizations with different mandates. With the establishment 
of a dual co-ordinating structure by Western allies and the UN, there exist multiple 
layers of authorities and responsibilities divided among different agencies. The High 
Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement is in charge of overall 
co-ordination and monitoring of civilian aspects of the operation. Contrary to other 
missions, the authority of SRSG is limited to the supervision of several UN functions in 
human rights, demining and policing. Various activities in the military security arenas 
have been co-ordinated by NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia (SFOR), while 
development issues have become a main focus of UNDP, UNICEF and other UN 
Specialized Agencies.  
 
(1) Co-ordinating Authorities 
 
The High Representative (HR) has the final authority regarding interpretation of the 
peace agreement on civilian implementation, such as the return of displaced persons and 
refugees, humanitarian assistance and the election process. The office is also involved in 
the co-ordination of economic reconstruction, social rehabilitation, political and legal 
affairs and the promotion of human rights.  
In the event of non-compliance of public officials with the Dayton Peace 
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Agreement, the office is given authority to dismiss them or impose decisions. The 
Office of High Representative (OHR) dismissed several federation government agency 
officials and issued decisions amending federation laws on fund management and 
employment. However, their authority has been challenged by an undemocratic 
nationalist elite whose power depends on the resistance to any change in the gains they 
obtained during wartime. In particular, dealing with the military and political 
organizations in the Croatian part of Bosnia proved to be a critical test. They exercise 
direct control over the local communities through taxation and confiscation of 
production facilities. The European Union Administration’s attempt to reorganize 
administrative district in Mostar was met by resistance from Croats. The control of 
extreme elements (which challenge the decisions of the High Representative) has been a 
formidable task, and so far the situation has been managed by avoiding violent 
confrontation with the local thugs. As recently as spring 2001, a nationalist Croat group 
used rioters to block the investigation of the banks controlled by a Croatian nationalist 
party (Washington Post, April 6). A lack of effective political pressure on the Croatian 
government (which can influence the local groups) by Western governments weakened 
the positions of the HR. 
The SRSG, as head of the United Nations Operations in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, exercises authority over the three major components of United Nations 
Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), including the United Nations 
International Police Task Force (IPTF), Civil Affairs and the Mine Action Center. The 
Special Representative also co-ordinates other UN activities in the areas of 
humanitarian relief and refugees, demining, human rights, elections and rehabilitation of 
infrastructure and economic reconstruction. In addition, the office organizes 
inter-agency meetings on a monthly basis to exchange information and coordinate 
overall UN activities with those of other international actors, especially OHR. 
In many ways, Bosnia can be compared with Cambodia where the UN was a 
single authority to supervise war termination. In Cambodia, institutional and structural 
simplicity of the mission was provided by the fact that the SRSG in Cambodia, Yasushi 
Akashi, was able to instruct and guide the overall peace process. In Bosnia, as major 
responsibilities to rebuild society belong to Western allies, OHR (which is responsible 
for the ad hoc Peace Implementation Council based in London) replaced SRSG for the 
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co-ordination function. However, the office lacked sufficient authority since it was not 
endowed with a proper leadership function, and UN agencies and Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have autonomy of their own operations. 
Another major difference was that civilian and military operations were 
married under the UNTAC umbrella, but the two components were not integrated in 
Bosnia. In Cambodia, joint military-civil co-ordinating groups were established to 
successfully meet with the challenges of maintaining security and holding the elections 
despite the threats from Khmer Rouge. UNTAC’s military unit was assigned to high and 
medium risk areas to support electoral preparations. In the areas of lower risk, civilians 
were protected by unarmed civilian police and UN military observer. The major 
weakness in the Bosnian operation is the separation of NATO (which contributed the 
majority of forces to peacekeeping) from the civilian administrative function (Williams, 
1999). 
 
(2) Democracy and Governance  
 
The United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) contributes to the 
establishment of the rule of law through a variety of programs on reform and 
monitoring of the police and the judicial system. Police monitoring, training and 
assistance have been provided by IPTF. The international police force was created to 
help the parties in BiH to carry out their low enforcement responsibilities as set forth by 
the Peace Agreement. The institutions need to be restructured in order to get a 
democratic, professional and multi-ethnic police force. The international police mission 
has been making progress in establishing truly multi-ethnic police force. IPTF advised 
local police on providing security for returning refugees and its training units addressed 
key public security issues such as organized crime, drugs and corruption as well as 
refugee returns. Its executive power was extended to investigate allegations of human 
rights violations by police officers. 
The Civil Affairs Officers, deployed with their civilian police colleagues, 
monitor human rights, political and socio-economic situations. By providing 
information and analysis, they support the activities of IPTF, SRSG and the High 
Representative. Alleged human rights violations are also investigated by officials at a 
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human rights division of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights. They frequently meet with judges, prosecutors and lawyers. Their ultimate goal 
is to support the creation of an independent judiciary.  
Along with bilateral projects like those of USAID’s Office of Transition 
Initiatives, the democratization branch of the OSCE has been interested in the 
development of civil society. Programs on local NGO development and formation of 
political parties have often been implemented by the National Democratic Institute and 
other Western based NGOs. These programs focus on promoting participatory 
government and an increased presence of women in the political arena as well as an 
emphasis on behavioral change with transmission of knowledge, skills and attitudes. 
Tension can arise between human rights and democracy programs due to their 
different skill sets and approaches. Whereas the democratization branch of OSCE wants 
to develop a working relationship with local authorities, the human rights branch has to 
respond to complaints against local officials through its advocacy role. 
Elections are the purview of the elections division of the OSCE, but 
collaborative efforts involve IPTF, UNHCR and SFOR in registration and protection of 
voters. The elections without the return of refugees do not reflect the pre-war population 
distribution and institutionalise ethnic power imbalance. Minority returns are thus 
linked to municipal and local government elections, since the elections conducted 
without the safe return of refugees can legitimise the outcome of ethnic cleansing.  
 
(3) Security and Military Functions 
 
The SFOR campaign has been endowed with the mandate of maintaining order by the 
General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP). SFOR deters a resumption of 
hostilities; provides selective support for civilian organizations; oversees 
de-militarization and also pursues war criminals warranted by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Through a close liaison, SFOR provides 
enforcement of certain IPTF directives since IPTF’s function is limited to monitoring, 
mentoring and assisting the local police with policing skills rather than actively getting 
involved in managing community violence. 
In response to concerns regarding a lack of effective communication between 
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civilian administrators and military commanders, the personnel with backgrounds of 
law enforcement, public health, communications, education and transportation have 
been deployed along with the troops to improve cooperative relations with OHR, OSCE 
and UNHCR (Williams, 1998). SFOR (and its predecessor NATO International 
Enforcement Force, known as IFOR) gave tactical support for OSCE in the logistical 
aspects of the operation such as transporting ballot boxes to polling stations. 
On the other hand, there has been some reluctance of the military to actively 
support human rights and other agencies engaged in law enforcement functions 
(Cousens, 2001). The War Crimes Tribunal (whose operation largely depends on 
assistance of enforcement forces) expressed frustration about a lack of more effective 
action by SFOR to arrest persons indicted for war crimes. Some national units of SFOR 
did not actively prevent local parties from interfering with freedom of movement 
supported by UNHCR. For instance, Italian contingents did not take any serious action 
when Serbs threw rocks on the buses, which were carrying Muslims visiting the graves 
of their relatives. Especially in Bosnia (where security issues are a major concern), the 
success of the civilian aspects of peace building relies on military support. 
In the absence of control over both civil and military offices by one person, 
Civil-Military Cooperation Centers can fulfill co-ordination functions with local and 
international civilian personnel. Although unified command is difficult to achieve in 
practice, an effective system of military and civil cooperation at all levels from strategic 
to tactical is essential for successful operation. Since UNHCR requires more support of 
the military components than other civilian agencies, a contact relationship between 
UNHCR and SFOR has been established not only at a headquarter level through the 
Combined Joint Civil Military Task Force but also at branch and field office levels.  
 
(4) Relief and Reconstruction 
 
The civilian peace building elements, in particular relief and development, are managed 
by UNHCR and UNDP. The Dayton Peace Accord assigned the UNHCR to coordinate 
humanitarian assistance and take the lead role for dealing with issues relating to 
refugees and displaced persons. UNHCR provides humanitarian assistance through 
special assistance programs such as home care and psycho-social support for the general 
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population, particularly the elderly, the handicapped, severely traumatized individuals 
and households with no income.  
In recognition that a lack of income is a major barrier to refugee resettlement, 
UNDP has a comprehensive approach to reconstruction/rehabilitation. It combines 
activities for rehabilitating shelter and social infrastructure with community 
development efforts to promote social cohesion in the smooth integration of refugees 
and displaced people. This approach is aimed at complementing the objectives of 
UNHCR in the areas of community development and promotion of reconciliation. At 
the same time, a large emphasis is placed on capacity building for strengthening a social 
safety net and supporting increased responsibilities of local authorities fo r social 
services. In order to help the return and peaceful integration of Croat and Serb refugees 
and displaced persons in Western Slovenia, UNDP and UNHCR collaborated on a 
rehabilitation and reconstruction project with distribution of basic agricultural 
equipment and reconstruction of schools and roads. 
UNHCR protection and field branch officers lack resources to deal with a large 
number of interpersonal and inter-communal problems. An effective response to these 
matters is beyond the capability and mandate of a single organization. On the matters of 
refugee abuses, the UNHCR gets reports from the Human Rights Branch of the OSCE 
mission. Housing projects for returnees are supported by the UNDP. UNHCR has to 
depend on IPTF and SFOR for the safety of returning refugees (Whitman, 1999, p. 128). 
The UNHCR also relies on other agencies to identify new returnees when it has low 
presence in local areas. Their programs are implemented at a community level through 
contracts with NGOs. 
 
(5) Economic Recovery 
 
Responsibility for economic recovery is split between international financial institutions 
and UN agencies. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund are responsible for 
aid coordination and have played a key role in financing Bosnia's reconstruction debt, in 
collaboration with bilateral and private donors (Vayrynen, 1997). UNDP has paid a 
greater attention to income generating activities through emergency employment and 
the establishment of micro-enterprises, while private sector donors are more interested 
 - 12 - 
in industrial and commercial development.  
Through reconstruction programs, UNDP supports reorganization of essential 
municipal and social services and rehabilitation of basic infrastructure such as local 
roads, education, health, power and water supplies. UNDP is also engaged in clearing 
the mined agricultural areas for farmers to cultivate. Recently the Resident Coordinator 
has taken an initiative of coordinating the preparation of a Common Country Study on 
development challenges in BiH aimed at fostering a common understanding among the 
agencies. 
 
IV. Operational and Tactical Level Implementation 
 
Main activities in consultation among local co-ordinators of international organizations 
include sharing information and exchanging different views. For example, in Banja 
Luka where regional headquarters are located, the liaison offices of the SFOR 
headquarters, IPTF and UNHCR are assigned to each other, holding regular meetings 
and co-ordinating policies. Here, staff can generally reconcile differences in the 
information that field offices present to them. 
At the operational level, the accomplishment of one agency’s goal depends on 
the support of others and often requires their involvement in common tasks. Planning of 
security for returnees demands a field level consultation between IPTF, the local police, 
SFOR and UNHCR. A high level of collaboration of these agencies has proven critical 
to successful refuge returns. In Drvar, a town in Northwest Bosnia, the local UNHCR 
and OSCE officers co-ordinated their weekly activities with IPTF and SFOR in order to 
handle an acute problem with Croat resistance to returns of Serb refugees. For local 
elections in the municipal area of Drvar, all the key international agencies are drawn 
together in meetings of the Election Results Implementation Committee. 
Operational agreements at a branch level can be undermined by the inability of 
the higher headquarters of their respective organizations to determine a common policy. 
Headquarters focus on strategic decisions that are more complex than lower level 
tactical operations. Exploring an effective means of maximising efforts at the tactical 
level is made difficult by a friction generated by higher headquarters of many 
organizations. In general, despite regular meetings organised by OHR, OSCE, SFOR 
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and the World Bank, horizontal co-ordination in Sarajevo seems to be less effective than 
at a lower level where their regional offices are located. 
The ability of international intervention to control local situations is affected by 
the degrees of each organization’s presence in the field. The requirements for having a 
capacity to gather information first-hand or to affect events directly depend on the 
nature of operations. Since the Office of the High Representative is only concerned 
about management and information rather than action on individual issues, their 
administrative structure does not reach beyond three regional offices in Banja Luka, 
Mostar and Brcko. Given their tasks, which demand daily operations at a community 
level, SFOR and IPTF maintain a strong presence in many local towns and villages. 
SFOR keeps large areas under close observation through regular patrols. IPTF has 
stations dispersed to the lowest level and accompanies local police on patrol. 
Organizations, which do not have a more elaborate vertical command structure, 
are less pervasive at an operational and tactical level. Although international field 
officers of OSCE and other major agencies have a wide variety of managerial, legal and 
policy implementation skills, the small number of officers in regional offices restricts 
the numbers of cases they can take on. Language barriers and cultural differences also 
remain a barrier to the operation of many offices at a local level. 
In general, organizations, in charge of military and police missions, reach all 
the way down to the tactical level. On the other hand, OHR, OSCE and UNHCR 
heavily use implementing partners to put their programs into effect because their 
operational functions do not penetrate effectively beyond regional offices. In addition, 
some service-oriented organizations find it difficult to set up a local infrastructure to 
implement their programs in a short time. These agencies rely on NGO implementing 
partners to have a direct impact. The skills and structure to address communal conflict 
largely reside with NGOs.  
 
V. The Role of NGOs 
 
Since NGOs began to be hailed as being capable of bringing peace and development to 
war-torn societies through grassroots level activities, many NGOs have been given a 
contractual responsibility for specific programs or activities as implementation partners. 
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The OHR, for example, contracted the International Crisis Group (ICG) to gather 
information and prepare reports. The OSCE democratisation branch works with local 
NGOs to develop civil society and build links between communities. While many 
NGOs often work as subcontractors, some large international NGOs can set up priorities, 
raise and distribute their own resources rather than operating under the direct control of 
their government or UN agencies. It is not unusual that NGOs cooperate as either 
parallel or contracting managers of food deliveries and other humanitarian services. 
The operational/tactical split between international agencies and NGOs has 
been particularly common for humanitarian relief and development work. In its 
co-ordinated scheme, many NGOs serve as sub-contractors who deliver specific goods 
and services. In running programs to support its activities, the UNHCR contracts many 
of the basic services. NGO partners implementing UNHCR programs provide packages 
for returnees who need to mend or re-build houses without roofs, windows or furniture 
and farmers stripped of tools, seed and livestock. 
Some NGOs are engaged in working on unarmed accompaniment and 
assistance to returnees. When returnees face hostility, threats and intimidation, NGO 
members accompany them to their houses and assist them with repairs. The presence of 
an international witness helps deter threats and harassment. NGOs can provide 
information that allows IPTF or OSCE Human Rights officers to follow up on specific 
incidents. The United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR), serving as a partner 
implementing the UNHCR programs, developed collaborative relationships with the 
IPFT and SFOR in identifying new returnees in Northwestern Bosnia where they have 
low presence. 
International organizations deal mainly with official government institutions, 
but have less contact with civil society. As discussed earlier, their capacity to collect and 
disseminate information and take action at the tactical level is enhanced by entering into 
partnership with NGOs. NGOs possess valuable information about the relative 
dependability of local groups and individuals and can easily establish logistics for 
various projects due to their long-standing relationship with local communities. 
NGOs have unique advantages in the areas of civil society building through 
their conscious efforts to establish relationships between adversarial communities, foster 
mutual confidence and provide peaceful mechanisms of dispute resolution. ‘Major 
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international agencies tend to embody organizational skills, while therapeutic and 
psychosocial skills often reside in smaller NGOs’ (Last, 2000, p. 85). In promoting 
reconciliation, various NGO programs have been active in strengthening inter-personal 
and inter-communal communication skills. 
The substance of peace building often hinges on conflict resolution skills, 
embedded in knowledge of the community. Owing to cultural and communication 
obstacles, the intervention of international staff is difficult at the community level. The 
same barriers also cause difficulties in developing plans at the operational level to 
support widespread action. Thus major international organizations develop or support 
local NGOs capable of carrying out projects in their own areas. 
For instance, in the areas of reconciliation, the community center model, with 
mixed local and international facilitators, provides a framework for deploying key 
interpersonal skills at grass roots level. The networks of community groups can be 
established across ethnic boundaries to explore indigenous knowledge and skills 
(Belloni, 2001). Both existing and potential groups, such as youth, women, pensioners, 
displaced people and refugees, can be organised as local grassroots groups for certain 
geographic areas. They can be linked together at a regional level to permit broader 
understanding and pursue common interests. 
In working with NGOs, flexibility in partnership arrangements is critical 
(Patrick, 2000). Donors should not insist too much on formal and institutionally 
verifiable goals on the part of any recipient operational body. Overall, the efficiency of 
small operation oriented NGOs depends on a minimum administrative overhead without 
the necessity of a formal management structure. Especially in the areas of development 
and civil society building, hierarchical structures with links to central headquarters are 
less effective at developing appropriate local strategies. Nor is it desirable to manage 
and control NGOs that can operate autonomously within their mandates. 
One group may get involved in overlapping areas of legal assistance, business 
development or psychosocial counseling, but diverse programs have to serve shared 
goals since the limited pool of resources constrains the activities of each project. It is 
critical that a project needs to take an integrated approach, for instance, by linking the 
provision of health care and development assistance to community reconciliation. 
Minority integration and return projects can be more effective when they are supported 
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by health or legal assistance programs. Community reconciliation, inter-cultural 
communication and education can be integrated into all aspects of social service 
programs.  
 
VI. Community Building 
 
Peace building initiatives are made more effective by a coherent campaign plan, which 
incorporates the skills of appropriate NGOs and utilizes their contacts embodied at the 
grass roots level. Infrastructure building has to be closely linked to the ‘social 
components’ of confidence building and community organization. Participation in 
public and volunteer works and informal contacts through neighbourhood programs has 
been suggested as a means of increasing confidence within the community.  The 
exchange of supplies and equipment between former enemies can lead to the 
development of common concerns affected by destruction. 
Various professional sectors such as education, religion and social welfare can 
be adapted to community reconciliation programs. Professional services in legal, health 
care and other areas have to promote dignity of the victims, a climate of mutual 
understanding, tolerance and respect for different cultures. More attention needs to be 
paid to linking social service programs to resolving tensions and disputes at an 
inter-group level.  
 
(1) Social and Legal Services 
 
Multiple agencies get involved in the mobilisation of resources for repairing houses as 
well as the prevention of vandalization or looting. Rebuilding the communal links 
requires efforts to assist estranged neighbours to share apartment blocks or streets again. 
At the same time, counselling and physical protection have to be provided for displaced 
minorities who prepare for return. A comprehensive program for a large-scale return of 
minorities has been supported by such international NGOs as Norwegian Refugee 
Council’s Minority Integration and Return Project. 
Advocate groups support and represent the rights of evicted elderly minority 
citizens and accompany their clients to local authorities. Legal assistance was provided 
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for vulnerable pensioners, refugees and displaced people who had basic questions about 
their rights and how to pursue them. Since the returnees’ rights are not compatible with 
the needs of displaced people or refugees occupying houses, support for population 
return may be perceived as adversarial. Legal expertise is needed in such classified 
areas as property and occupancy rights, elections, pensions, family law, communal 
access and contracts. 
Owing to contradictory laws about property rights and procedures, Movimiento 
por la Paz, el Desarme y la Libertad (MPDL), a Spanish-based international NGO with 
programs in more than forty countries, solicits support from an international legal 
community. As an implementing partner for UNHCR, it assists with return and 
resettlement. Their work depends on an extensive network of legal aid in advising 
refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons and eventually representing them in 
court. In the areas of Banja Luka, lawyers provided help at their offices, or a mobile 
team was dispatched regularly to visit near-by municipalities with the concentration of 
one thousand displaced persons and refugees. 
The goal of reconciling interests and preferences at a personal level and 
rebuilding stable neighbourhood relationships cannot simply be achieved by enforcing 
eviction. The perception of minority groups as infiltrators should be reduced through 
community building projects. In order to understand complex social and interpersonal 
issues beyond legal classification, the assistance of social workers is needed. Local 
social workers help categorise various concerns such as repossession of former homes 
and other properties and non-discriminatory housing not only on legal but also social 
terms. That helped MPDL implement psychosocial programs for refugees and displaced 
people in Northwest Bosnia.  
 
(2) Health Care  
 
The practical interaction on common welfare provides a context for sustained 
co-operation between communities. Humanitarian action in the field of health care can 
be designed to provide an incentive for continued engagement of formerly estranged 
communities with each other. Health Bridges for Peace is a project that supports the 
prevention of inter-communal conflict with health care programs. It has been visible in 
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several communities in the former Yugoslavia, and its activities were endorsed by the 
World Health Organization. Health care delivery is combined with training in 
psychological skills as part of a conflict-management component. 
In delivering primary health care, medical professionals representing diverse 
communities can develop inter-communal communication, promote trust and create 
avenues for the peaceful resolution of differences (Beigbeder, 1999). Through medical 
functions, the Medical Network for Social Reconstruction for ex-Yugoslavia (Ex-Y 
Medical Network) advocates a model of inter-ethnic reconciliation and co-operation. 
The creation of training programs across political and communal boundaries resulted in 
the establishment of ‘Health and Reconciliation Teams’. Various service programs 
implemented by foreign donors should support local programs, which pursue the goal of 
overcoming ethnic or racial prejudice.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
Peace building activities in Bosnia suggest complexities of various operations and the 
roles of different actors at different levels (strategic, operational and tactical). While 
co-ordination for activities at operational and tactical levels in the areas of relief work 
and conduct of elections can be considered effective, more support for OHR policies 
toward the corruption of Bosnian government officials and the nationalist Croat 
resistance to the efforts to establish a more integrated country is needed at the strategic 
level.  
Although some agencies such as UNHCR rely more on co-ordination for 
effective operation, the quality of an inter-agency framework at every level has a 
significant impact on the success or failure of the entire operation. Different 
expectations about the relationship make co-ordination among agencies difficult. Each 
international agency operates according to its own understanding of the situation, 
intervention policies and practice. Interagency dialogue is necessary for promoting 
mutual understanding of differences in organizational norms, values and beliefs as well 
as past practice. Inefficient co-ordination at higher levels can be compensated by 
‘focusing on building peaceful communities from the bottom up, where structures have 
the most impact on people’s lives’ (Last, 2000, p. 88). 
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